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Weak coin flipping is among the fundamental cryptographic primitives which ensure the security
of modern communication networks. It allows two mistrustful parties to remotely agree on a random
bit when they favor opposite outcomes. Unlike other two-party computations, one can achieve
information-theoretic security using quantum mechanics only: both parties are prevented from
biasing the flip with probability higher than 1/2 + , where  is arbitrarily low. Classically, the
dishonest party can always cheat with probability 1 unless computational assumptions are used.
Despite its importance, no physical implementation has been proposed for quantum weak coin
flipping. Here, we present a practical protocol that requires a single photon and linear optics only.
We show that it is fair and balanced even when threshold single-photon detectors are used, and
reaches a bias as low as  = 1/
√
2− 1/2 ≈ 0.207. We further show that the protocol may display
quantum advantage over a few hundred meters with state-of-the-art technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern communication networks are continuously ex-
panding, as the number of users and available online re-
sources increases. On a daily basis, users must inevitably
trust local network nodes and transmission channels in
order to perform sensitive tasks such as private data
transmission, online banking, electronic voting, delegated
computing and many more. A complex network can be se-
cured by relying on a collection of simpler cryptographic
primitives, or building blocks, which are combined to
guarantee overall security. Strong coin flipping (SCF)
is one of such primitives, in which two parties remotely
agree on a random bit such that none of the parties can
bias the outcome with probability higher than 1/2 + ,
where  is the protocol bias. SCF is fundamental in mul-
tiparty computation [1], online gaming and more general
randomized consensus protocols involving leader election
[2].
Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a version of coin flipping
in which both parties have a preferred, opposite outcome:
it effectively designates a winner and a loser. In the classi-
cal world, information-theoretically secure SCF and WCF
are impossible: they require computational assumptions
or trusting a third party [3–6]. Using quantum properties,
on the other hand, enables information-theoretically se-
cure SCF and WCF: the lowest possible bias for quantum
SCF is  = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 [9], while quantum WCF may
achieve a bias arbitrarily close to zero [10, 11]. Remark-
ably, quantum WCF is also involved in the construction
of optimal quantum SCF and quantum bit commitment
schemes [7, 8]. Although the works from [10, 11] proved
the existence of quantum WCF protocols achieving arbi-
trarily low biases, no explicit protocol had been provided.
In 2002, two explicit protocols with small biases were
proposed: the work from [12] achieved  ≈ 0.239, while
[13] achieved  = 1/
√
2− 1/2 ≈ 0.207, which is inciden-
tally the SCF lower bound. Later, it was shown that
the scheme from [13] in fact belonged to a larger fam-
ily of WCF protocols with  = 1/6 ≈ 0.167 [14, 15].
Very recently, a new explicit family of protocols achieved
 ≈ 1/10 [16], followed by arbitrarily low biases [17].
While quantum SCF protocols have been experimen-
tally demonstrated [18–20], no implementation has been
proposed for quantum WCF. This may be explained by
two reasons. First, it is difficult to find an encoding and
implementation which is robust to losses: a dishonest
party may always declare an abort when they are not
satisfied with the flip’s outcome. Second, none of the
previously mentioned protocols translate trivially into a
simple experiment: they involve performing single-shot
generalized measurements [13] or generating beyond-qubit
states [12].
In this work, we introduce a family of quantum WCF
protocols, inspired by [13], which achieve biases as low
as  = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207. These protocols involve
simple projective measurements instead of generalized
ones, require a single photon and linear optics only, and
need at most three rounds of communication between
the parties. The information is encoded by mixing the
single photon with vacuum on an unbalanced beam split-
ter, which generates entanglement between the photon
number modes [21]: both parties may then agree on a
random bit, while the entanglement is simultaneously ver-
ified. We also use a version of our schemes to construct a
quantum SCF protocol with bias ≈ 0.31. We further de-
rive a practical security proof for both number-resolving
and threshold single-photon detectors, considering the
extension to infinite Hilbert spaces. Since the presence
of losses may enable classical protocols to reach lower
cheating probabilities than quantum protocols, we finally
show that our fair and balanced quantum protocol bears
no classical equivalent over a few hundred meters of lossy
optical fiber and non-unit detection efficiency.
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2II. PROTOCOL AND CORRECTNESS
In the honest protocol, Alice and Bob wish to toss a
fair coin, with a priori knowledge that they each favor
opposite outcomes. Fig. 1 represents the implementation
of the honest protocol, which follows five distinct steps.
Defining x ∈ [0, 12 ] as a free protocol parameter, these
read:
• Alice mixes a single photon with the vacuum on a
beam splitter of reflectivity x.
• Alice keeps the first spatial mode, and directs the
second spatial mode to Bob.
• Bob mixes the state he receives with the vacuum
on a beam splitter of reflectivity y = 1− 12(1−x) .
• Bob measures the second register of his state with a
single-photon detector, and broadcasts the outcome
c ∈ {0, 1}.
• The last step is a verification step, which splits into
two cases. If c = 0, Alice sends her state to Bob,
who mixes it with his state on a beam splitter of re-
flectivity z = 2x. He then measures the two output
modes with single-photon detectors. He declares
Alice the winner if the outcome (b1, b0) = (1, 0) is
obtained. If c = 1: Bob discards his state, and
Alice measures her state with a single-photon de-
tector. She declares Bob the winner if the outcome
is a = 0.
We show that the protocol is fair, i.e. that the probability
of winning for each party is 12 when they are both honest.
Single photons are quantized excitations of the electro-
magnetic field, which are described by the action of the
creation operator onto the vacuum. Beam splitters act
linearly on creation operators, and leave invariant the
vacuum. Hence, the evolution of the quantum state over
the three modes up to Bob’s measurement reads:
|100〉 →
(x),12
√
x |100〉+√1− x |010〉
→
(y),23
√
x |100〉+
√
(1− x)y |010〉
+
√
(1− x)(1− y) |001〉 ,
(1)
where the notation (t), kl indicates the reflectivity of
the beam splitter and the corresponding spatial modes.
Hence, the probability that Bob obtains outcome c =
1 when measuring the third register is P (1) = (1 −
x)(1 − y), while the probability of outcome c = 0 is
P (0) = 1 − P (1). Having set y = 1 − 12(1−x) ensures
P (0) = P (1) = 12 . When c = 1, the state on modes 1
and 2 is projected onto |00〉, while c = 0 projects the
state onto
√
2x |10〉 + √1− 2x |01〉. In the first case,
the measurement performed by Alice outputs a = 0
FIG. 1: Representation of the honest protocol.
The dashed boxes indicate Alice and Bob’s laboratories,
respectively. The beam splitter reflectivities are indicated
in red brackets. |0〉 and |1〉 are the vacuum and single
photon Fock states, respectively. Curly lines represent
fiber used for quantum communication from Alice to
Bob, or delay lines within Alice’s or Bob’s laboratory,
when waiting for the other party’s communication. Bob
broadcasts the classical outcome c, which controls an
optical switch on Alice’s side. The protocol when Bob
declares c = 0/1 is represented in orange/green. The final
outcomes (a, b1, b0) = (0, 1, 0) are the expected outcomes
when both parties are honest.
with probability 1. In the second case, the measurement
performed by Bob after the beam splitter with reflectivity
z outputs (b1, b0) = (1, 0) with probability 1. Hence, the
probability that Alice (resp. Bob) wins is directly given
by P (A)h = P (0) (resp. P
(B)
h = P (1)). This shows that
the protocol is fair, since P (0) = P (1) = 12 .
III. SECURITY
We now derive the security of the protocol. Namely, we
obtain the probabilities of winning when Bob is dishonest
and Alice is honest, and vice versa.
A. Dishonest Bob, honest Alice
Dishonest Bob should always declare the outcome c = 1
in order to maximize his winning probability. The out-
come of the coin flip is then confirmed if Alice obtains
the outcome a = 0 upon verification. Bob thus needs
to maximize the probability of the outcome a = 0, ap-
plying a general quantum operation to his half of the
state. However, the probability that the detector clicks
is independent of Bob’s action. It is given by x, so that
Bob’s winning probability is upper bounded by (1− x).
This upper bound is reached if Bob discards his half of
3the state and broadcasts c = 1. Then, Bob’s optimal
cheating probability is P (B)d = 1− x.
B. Dishonest Alice, honest Bob
Alice wins when Bob declares c = 0 and the outcome of
his quantum measurement is (b1, b0) = (1, 0). The most
general strategy of dishonest Alice is to send a (mixed)
state σ, while Bob performs the rest of the protocol
honestly. We find that the security is derived easily if
Bob is allowed photon number resolving detectors (see
Appendix B for details of all the proofs).
Remarkably, the protocol is still secure even when
Bob only uses threshold detectors, which is essential
to the practicality of the protocol. Moreover, Alice’s
optimal cheating probability remains the same in both
cases: P (A)d = 1− (1− y)(1− z), which equals 12(1−x) for
y = 1− 12(1−x) and z = 2x. In particular, for all values
of x, we retrieve the property shared by the protocols
of [13]: P (A)d P
(B)
d = 12 .
The underlying idea in the security analysis for thresh-
old and number resolving detectors is that Alice must gen-
erate the state which maximizes the overlap with Bob’s
projectors |100〉 〈100| and ∑∞n=1 |n00〉 〈n00|, respectively.
Setting x = 1 − 1/√2, we obtain a version of the pro-
tocol which is balanced, i.e. both players have the same
cheating probability 1/
√
2. The protocol bias is then
 = 1/
√
2− 1/2 ≈ 0.207.
Moreover, following [7], we show in Appendix C that a
suitable choice of parameters x,y,z yielding an unbalanced
quantum WCF protocol allows to construct a quantum
SCF protocol with bias ≈ 0.31.
IV. FAULT TOLERANCE
A. Noise
We now investigate how imperfect state generation,
non-ideal beam splitters and single-photon detector dark
counts affect the correctness and security of the protocol.
While we fixed the parameter values to y = 1 − 12(1−x)
and z = 2x in the ideal setting, we now allow the three
parameters x, y, z to vary freely.
The vacuum/single-photon encoding is very robust to
noise, in comparison to polarization or phase encoding
for instance: the only property that must be preserved
through propagation is photon number. Alice may simply
produce a heralded single photon via spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion (SPDC) [22], which generates
a photon pair: one may be used for the flip, while the
other may herald the presence of the first one. Given the
photon-pair emission probability p, accidentally emitting
two pairs at the same time using SPDC occurs with prob-
ability p2. Since p may be arbitrarily tuned by changing
the pump power, p2—and therefore the probability of
two photons being accidentally generated by Alice at
once—may then be decreased to negligible values.
Note that, in the case where Alice’s single photon
source is probabilistic but heralded (as in SPDC), she
may always inform Bob of a successful state generation
prior to his announcement of c without compromising
security. In what follows, we may therefore assume that
both parties have agreed on the presence of an initial
state, and hence know when the protocol occurs.
Noise will therefore stem from the non-ideal reflectivi-
ties of the beam splitters, and the non-zero detector dark
count probability pdc. For each party, these may affect
the protocol correctness in two ways: an undesired bias
of the flip, and an added abort probability during the
verification process.
Deviations on the beam splitter reflectivities x, y, and
z will first change the honest winning probabilities: these
may be re-calculated by replacing the ideal reflectivity
r ∈ {x, y} with an imperfect r′. As regards to honest
aborts, a beam splitter with reflectivity z′ instead of z
may be applied on the resulting state when c = 0. Noisy
detectors may cause an unwanted abort corresponding to
a click because of dark counts. However, with supercon-
ducting nanowire single-photon detectors, this probability
is typically very low, of the order of pdc < 10−8 [23].
We can therefore conclude that any source of noise
may be incorporated in the security analysis by simply
replacing parameters x, y, and z with x′, y′, and z′.
Furthermore, this source of error will most likely be
negligible with current technology. We therefore solely
focus on the more consequential effects of losses.
B. Losses
Losses can be due to non-unit channel and delay line
transmissions, as well as non-unit detection efficiency.
We label ηt the transmission efficiency of the quantum
channel from Alice to Bob. We also define as η(i)f the
transmission of party i’s fiber delay, while η(i)d denotes the
detection efficiency of party i’s single-photon detectors.
Here, we assume the efficiencies of Bob’s detectors to
be the same, and that each party introduces a fiber
delay whenever they are waiting for the other party’s
communication. The delay time therefore depends on the
distance between the two parties.
In the presence of losses, the protocol may also abort
when both parties are honest, when the photon is lost.
We derive in Appendix D the expressions for the two
honest winning probabilities P (A)h and P
(B)
h , and hence
4the probability Pab of abort, in the presence of losses:
P
(A)
h = ηtη
(B)
d
(√
xzη
(A)
f +
√
(1− x)y(1− z)η(B)f
)2
P
(B)
h = ηtη
(B)
d (1− x)(1− y)
Pab = 1− P (A)h − P (B)h .
(2)
Note that the overall correctness does not depend on
Alice’s detection efficiency η(A)d , since the declaration
of outcome c depends solely on Bob’s detector, and the
verification step on Alice’s side involves detecting vacuum.
V. SECURITY IN THE PRESENCE OF LOSSES
Dishonest Bob’s best strategy is to perform the same
attack as in the lossless case, because he has no control
over Alice’s half of the subsystem. His winning probability
is then P (B)d = 1−xη(A)f η(A)d . However, in a more general
game-theoretic scenario, Bob’s best strategy will in fact
depend on the rewards and sanctions associated with
honest aborts and "getting caught cheating" aborts. In
other words, Bob has to minimize his risk-to-reward ratio.
Maximizing his winning probability makes him run the
risk of getting caught cheating with probability xη(A)f η
(A)
d .
Dishonest Alice must still generate the state which
maximizes the (b1, b0, c) = (1, 0, 0) outcome on Bob’s de-
tectors after his honest transformations have been applied.
However, the expression for Bob’s corresponding projec-
tor now changes, as there is a finite probability (1−η(B)d )n
that the n-photon component is projected onto the vac-
uum. The 0 outcome on one spatial mode is therefore
triggered by the projection Π0 =
∑∞
n=0(1−η(B)d )n |n〉 〈n|.
The total projector responsible for the (b1, b0, c) = (1, 0, 0)
outcome then reads Π100 = (1−Π0)⊗Π0⊗Π0. We show
in Appendix E that dishonest Alice’s maximum winning
probability P (A)d satisfies:
max
l>0
[(
1− (1− yη(B)f )(1− z)η(B)d
)l
−
(
1− η(B)d
)l]
6 1− (1− y)(1− z).
(3)
The value of the upper bound on the right hand side
is Alice’s cheating probability in the lossless case. This
shows that Alice cannot take advantage of Bob’s imperfect
detectors or his lossy delay line in order to increase her
cheating probability. We now provide a sketch of the
proof: since passive linear optical elements act linearly
on creation operators, equal losses on different modes may
be commuted through the interferometer of the protocol.
This allows to upper bound Alice’s maximum winning
probability by her winning probability in an equivalent
picture in which the losses happen just after her state
preparation, then followed by a lossless protocol. In that
FIG. 2: Practical quantum advantage for a fair
and balanced protocol. Numerical values for the low-
est classical and quantum cheating probabilities, PCd and
PQd , are plotted as a function of distance d in dashed
blue and dotted red, respectively. Honest abort proba-
bility Pab (responsible for PQd being lower than our ideal
quantum cheating probability 1/
√
2) is plotted in solid
magenta. Our quantum protocol performs strictly bet-
ter than any classical protocol when PQd < PCd . We
set ηf = ηsη2t , where ηs is the fiber delay transmission
corresponding to 500ns of optical switching time, and
η2t =
(
10− 0.210 d
)2
is the fiber delay transmission associ-
ated with travelling distance d twice (once for quantum,
once for classical) in single-mode fibers with attenuation
0.2 dB/km. We have ηd = 0.95 and z = 0.57. For
performance with lower ηd = 0.90, please see Appendix
G.
case, it is as if dishonest Alice was trying to cheat in
the lossless protocol, while being restricted to lossy state
preparation instead of ideal state preparation.
VI. PRACTICAL PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE
We now analyze the performance of our protocol in
a practical setting, by enforcing three conditions on the
free parameters: the protocol must be fair, balanced, and
perform strictly better than any classical protocol. The
latter condition is not required in an ideal implemen-
tation, since quantum WCF always provides a security
advantage over classical WCF. Allowing for abort cases,
however, may enable some classical protocols to perform
better than quantum ones. This is because increasing the
abort probability effectively decreases Alice and Bob’s
cheating probabilities. We say that the protocol allows
for quantum advantage when it provides a strictly lower
cheating probability than any classical protocol with the
same abort probability. This is obtained using the bounds
from [24], which yield the best classical cheating probabil-
ity PCd = 1−
√
Pab for our protocol (see Appendix F). The
5three conditions may then be translated into the following
system of equations, where we define PQd = P
(A)
d = P
(B)
d :

(i) P (A)h = P
(B)
h fairness
(ii) P (A)d = P
(B)
d balance
(iii) PQd < PCd quantum advantage
(4)
Fig. 2 shows a choice of parameters for which system (4)
is satisfied, up to a distance of d km.
VII. DISCUSSION
By noticing a non-trivial connection between the early
protocol from [13] and linear optical transformations, we
answer the question of the implementability of quantum
weak coin flipping, and show that it is achievable with
current technology over a few hundred meters. Both
parties require a set of beam splitters and single photon
threshold detectors. State generation on Alice’s side
can be performed with any heralded probabilistic single-
photon source. Only Alice requires an optical switch,
which is commercially available. Although short-term
quantum storage is needed, a spool of optical fiber with
twice the length of the quantum channel suffices, and
provides the required storage/retrieval efficiency.
As the distance increases, the issue of interferometric
stability should also be considered. Prior to the protocol,
Alice and Bob may use similar techniques to twin-field
quantum key distribution implementations to lock the
interference [28, 29], as it is in their interest to collaborate
on this task to avoid the protocol from aborting.
On the fundamental level, our results also raise the
question of a potentially deeper connection between the
large family of protocols from [10, 14, 15]—which achieves
biases as low as 1/6—and linear optics. Recalling that
the protocol from [13], and hence our protocol, is con-
jectured optimal for this family, its extension to many
rounds should be necessary in order to lower the bias.
The optimality of the one-round protocol is crucial, as
a recent result shows that the WCF bias decreases very
inefficiently with the number of rounds [30].
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Appendix
In this appendix, we give detailed proofs of the results presented in the main text. Section A contains preliminary
technical results. In Section B, we provide the security analysis for dishonest Alice. In Section C, we show how
an unbalanced version of our WCF protocol may yield a SCF protocol. In Section D we derive the completeness
of the protocol in the lossy case, and in Section E, we extend the security analysis to the case of a lossy protocol.
In Section F we solve the system in Eq. (4) of the main text, and derive the constraints that the parameters of
the protocol must satisfy in order to obtain a fair and balanced protocol which still outperforms all classical WCF
protocols in the lossy case. Finally, in Section G, we display the practical performance of our fair and balanced
protocol for various detection efficiencies.
Appendix A: Preliminary results
Single photons are obtained by the action of the creation operator onto the vacuum. Beam splitters act linearly on
creation operators, and leave invariant the vacuum. More precisely, a beam splitter of reflectivity t acting on modes
k, l maps the creation operators aˆ†k, aˆ
†
l onto bˆ
†
k, bˆ
†
l , wherebˆ†k
bˆ†l
 = H(t)kl
aˆ†k
aˆ†l
 , (A1)
where
H
(r)
kl =
 √r √1− r√
1− r −√r
 . (A2)
In the following, we make use of a simple reduction which allows to simplify calculations in the proofs:
Lemma 1. Let U = (H(z) ⊗ 1)(1⊗H(y)), with z > 0. For all density matrices τ ,
Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)U ] = Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V †(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V ], (A3)
where V = (1⊗H(b))(H(a) ⊗ 1)(1⊗R(pi)⊗ 1), with a = y(1−z)1−(1−y)(1−z) and b = 1− (1− y)(1− z), and R(pi) a phase
shift of pi acting on mode 2.
Proof. The action of U on the creation operators is given by
U =

√
z
√
1− z 0
√
1− z −√z 0
0 0 1


1 0 0
0 √y √1− y
0
√
1− y −√y

=

√
z
√
y(1− z) √(1− y)(1− z)
√
1− z −√yz −√(1− y)z
0
√
1− y −√y
 .
(A4)
7Linear interferometers map product coherent states onto product coherent states, and, for all α ∈ C, we have that
U† |α00〉 = |β1β2β3〉, where 
β1
β2
β3
 =

α
√
z
α
√
y(1− z)
α
√
(1− y)(1− z)
 . (A5)
We have V = (1⊗H(b))(H(a) ⊗ 1)(1⊗ R(pi)⊗ 1), with a, b ∈ [0, 1], and R(pi) a phase shift of pi acting on mode 2.
The action of V on the creation operators is given by
V =

1 0 0
0
√
b
√
1− b
0
√
1− b −√b


√
a
√
1− a 0
√
1− a −√a 0
0 0 1


1 0 0
0 −1 0
0 0 1

=

√
a −√1− a 0√
b(1− a) √ab √1− b√
(1− a)(1− b) √a(1− b) −√b
 .
(A6)
For all α ∈ C, V † |0α0〉 = |γ1γ2γ3〉, where 
γ1
γ2
γ3
 =

α
√
b(1− a)
α
√
ab
α
√
1− b
 . (A7)
Since a = y(1−z)1−(1−y)(1−z) and b = 1− (1− y)(1− z), we have b(1− a) = z, ab = y(1− z), and 1− b = (1− y)(1− z), so
(β1, β2, β3) = (γ1, γ2, γ3). Then,
Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)U ] = 1
pi
∫
C
d2αTr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |α00〉 〈α00|U ]
= 1
pi
∫
C
d2αTr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V † |0α0〉 〈0α0|V ]
= Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V †(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V ],
(A8)
where we used the completeness relation of coherent states 1 = 1pi
∫
C |α〉 〈α| d2α.
We also recall a useful simple property, which we will use extensively in the following:
Lemma 2. Equal losses on various modes can be commuted through passive linear optical elements acting on these
modes.
This result was proven, e.g., in [25], and we give hereafter a quick proof for completeness.
Proof. One way to prove this statement is to use the fact that any interferometer may be decomposed as beam
splitters and phase shifters [26]. Then, losses trivially commute with phase shifters, and are easily shown to commute
with beam splitters. Indeed, consider a beam splitter of reflectivity t acting on modes 1 and 2. Its action on the
creation operators of the modes is given by
aˆ†1, aˆ
†
2 →
√
taˆ†1 +
√
1− taˆ†2,
√
1− taˆ†1 −
√
taˆ†2, (A9)
8while equal losses η on both modes act as
aˆ†1, aˆ
†
2 →
√
ηaˆ†1,
√
ηaˆ†2. (A10)
Hence, the action of the beam splitter followed by losses is given by
aˆ†1, aˆ
†
2 →
√
η(
√
taˆ†1 +
√
1− taˆ†2),
√
η(
√
1− taˆ†1 −
√
taˆ†2), (A11)
while losses followed by the beam splitter act as
aˆ†1, aˆ
†
2 →
√
t(√ηaˆ†1) +
√
1− t(√ηaˆ†2),
√
1− t(√ηaˆ†1)−
√
t(√ηaˆ†2), (A12)
which is equal to the previous evolution.
In what follows, we let the parameters x, y, z vary freely, and derive the relation these parameters need to satisfy to
enforce a honest protocol without abort cases. As presented in the main text, when both parties are honest (Fig. 1),
the evolution of the quantum state over the three modes up to Bob’s first measurement reads:
|100〉 →
(x),12
√
x |100〉+√1− x |010〉
→
(y),23
√
x |100〉+
√
(1− x)y |010〉+
√
(1− x)(1− y) |001〉 ,
(A13)
where the notation (t), kl indicates the reflectivity of the beam splitter and the corresponding spatial modes. Hence,
the probability that Bob obtains outcome c = 1 when measuring the third register is P (1) = (1− x)(1− y), while the
probability of outcome c = 0 is P (0) = 1− P (1).
If Bob registers the outcome c = 1, then the post-measurement state on Alice’s side is |0〉, which will always pass
the verification step.
If Bob registers the outcome c = 0, then the post-measurement state reads:√
x
1− (1− x)(1− y) |10〉+
√
(1− x)y
1− (1− x)(1− y) |01〉 . (A14)
The value of the parameter z should be fixed to
z = x1− (1− x)(1− y) , (A15)
so that this state passes the verification step, and that the protocol doesn’t abort in the honest case. We assume this
relation holds in the following. In that case, the winning probabilities of Alice and Bob in the honest case are given by
P
(A)
h = 1− (1− x)(1− y)
P
(B)
h = (1− x)(1− y).
(A16)
The protocol is fair when (1− x)(1− y) = 12 . In that case, y = 1− 12(1−x) and z = 2x.
Let us also recall from the main text that in the general case, the winning probability of dishonest Bob is given by
P
(B)
d = 1− x. (A17)
Appendix B: Security analysis for Dishonest Alice without losses
1. Bob has number-resolving detectors
When using number-resolving single-photon detectors, any projection onto the n > 1 photon subspace leads to
Alice getting caught cheating. Alice must therefore maximize the overlap with the projective measurement |100〉 〈100|
9FIG. 3: Dishonest Alice. Alice aims to maximize the outcome (1, 0, 0): an outcome 0 on the third mode means
that Bob declared Alice the winner, while an outcome (1, 0) for modes 1 and 2 means that Alice passed Bob’s
verification. The reflectivities of the beamsplitter are given by y = 1− 12(1−x) and z = 2x.
only (Fig. 3). Let σ be the state sent by Alice. Let U = (H(z) ⊗ 1)(1⊗H(y)), with z = x1−(1−x)(1−y) . Alice needs to
maximize the probability of the overall outcome (1, 0, 0), which is given by
P
(A)
d = Tr[U(σ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |100〉 〈100|], (B1)
since Bob uses number-resolving detectors. By convexity of the probabilities, we may assume without loss of generality
that Alice sends a pure state σ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|, which allows us to write:
P
(A)
d = Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |100〉 〈100|]
= Tr[(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |100〉 〈100|U ]
= Tr[〈ψ| ⊗ 〈0|U† |100〉 〈100|U |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉].
(B2)
We have:
U† |100〉 = (1⊗H(y))(H(z) ⊗ 1) |100〉
= (1⊗H(y))(√z |100〉+√1− z |010〉)
=
√
z |100〉+
√
y(1− z) |010〉+
√
(1− y)(1− z) |001〉 ,
(B3)
and therefore:
U† |100〉 〈100|U =z |100〉 〈100|+ y(1− z) |010〉 〈010|+ (1− y)(1− z) |001〉 〈001|
+
√
yz(1− z) (|100〉 〈010|+ |010〉 〈100|)
+
√
z(1− y)(1− z) (|100〉 〈001|+ |001〉 〈100|)
+ (1− z)
√
y(1− y) (|010〉 〈001|+ |001〉 〈010|) .
(B4)
Substituting back into Eq. (B2) then reduces to:
P
(A)
d = 〈ψ|
(
z |10〉 〈10|+ y(1− z) |01〉 〈01|+
√
yz(1− z)(|10〉 〈01|+ |01〉 〈10|)
)
|ψ〉
= 〈ψ|
(√
z |10〉+
√
y(1− z) |01〉
)(√
z 〈10|+
√
y(1− z) 〈01|
)
|ψ〉
=
∣∣∣〈ψ|(√z |10〉+√y(1− z) |01〉)∣∣∣2 .
(B5)
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality then allows to upper bound P (A)d as:
P
(A)
d 6 ‖ψ‖2
∥∥∥(√z |10〉+√y(1− z) |01〉)∥∥∥2 6 (1− (1− y)(1− z))‖ψ‖2, (B6)
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which is maximized for ‖ψ‖ = 1. Hence we finally get:
P
(A)
d 6 1− (1− y)(1− z). (B7)
In order to find Alice’s optimal cheating strategy (i.e.the optimal pure state |φ〉 that she must send to achieve
this bound), we remark that the unnormalized state
√
z |10〉+√y(1− z) |01〉 maximizes the expression in Eq. (B6).
Normalizing this state then provides Alice’s optimal strategy, which is to prepare the state
|φ〉 :=
√
z
1− (1− y)(1− z) |10〉+
√
y(1− z)
1− (1− y)(1− z) |01〉 . (B8)
Hence,
P
(A)
d = 1− (1− y)(1− z). (B9)
In the case of a fair protocol, y = 1− 12(1−x) and z = 2x, so
P
(A)
d =
1
2(1− x) , (B10)
and Alice’s optimal strategy is to prepare the state
|φx〉 := 2
√
x(1− x) |10〉+ (1− 2x) |01〉 . (B11)
2. Bob has threshold detectors
Unlike the previous case, incorrect outcomes with higher photon number could still pass the test: for n ≥ 1, the
threshold detectors cannot discriminate between a |100〉 and |n00〉 projection. We show in the following that this
doesn’t help a dishonest Alice, and that the strategy described previously for the case of number resolving detectors
is still optimal in the case of threshold detectors.
With the same notations as in the previous proof, Alice needs to maximize the probability of the overall outcome
(1, 0, 0), hence the overlap with the projector
∑∞
n=1 |n00〉 〈n00| = (1− |0〉 〈0|)⊗ |00〉 〈00|. This allows us to write:
P
(A)
d = Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†((1− |0〉 〈0|)⊗ |00〉 〈00|)], (B12)
since Bob uses threshold detectors, where U = (H(z) ⊗ 1)(1⊗H(y)), with z = x1−(1−x)(1−y) .
Linear optical evolution conserves photon number. Hence if Alice sends the vacuum state, the detectors will never
click. Removing the two-mode vacuum component of the state prepared by Alice and renormalizing therefore always
increases her winning probability. Since we are looking for the maximum winning probability, we can assume without
loss of generality that 〈ψ|00〉 = 0, i.e.
Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |000〉 〈000|] = | 〈ψ|00〉 |2, (B13)
So maximizing the winning probability in Eq. (B12) is equivalent to maximizing
P˜
(A)
d = Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)], (B14)
given the constraint 〈ψ|00〉 = 0. We have
P˜
(A)
d = Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)]
= Tr[(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)U ].
(B15)
With Lemma 1 and Eq. (B15), we may thus write:
P˜
(A)
d = Tr[(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V †(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V ], (B16)
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FIG. 4: Equivalent picture for dishonest Alice. In the original dishonest setup of Fig. 3, Alice aims to maximize
the outcome (1, 0, 0). This is equivalent to Alice maximizing outcome 0 on spatial modes 1 and 3, independently of what
is detected on mode 2. The outcomes indicated correspond to Alice winning. The reflectivity is b = 1− (1− y)(1− z).
where V = (1⊗H(b))(H(a) ⊗ 1)(1⊗R(pi)⊗ 1), with a = y(1−z)1−(1−y)(1−z) and b = 1− (1− y)(1− z). Let us now define:
|ψa〉 := H(a)(1⊗R(pi)) |ψ〉 . (B17)
The constraints 〈ψ|00〉 = 0 and 〈ψa|00〉 = 0 are equivalent, because the above transformation leaves the total number
of photons invariant. With Eq. (B16) we obtain
P˜
(A)
d = Tr[(|ψa〉 〈ψa| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(1⊗H(b))(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(1⊗H(b))], (B18)
with the constraint 〈ψa|00〉 = 0. Maximizing this expression thus corresponds to maximizing the probability of the
outcome (0, 0) when measuring modes 1 and 3 of the state obtain by mixing the second half of |ψa〉 with the vacuum
on a beam splitter of reflectivity b = 1− (1− y)(1− z) (Fig. 4).
We now show that an optimal strategy for Alice is to ensure that |ψa〉 = |01〉. Let us write
|ψa〉 =
∑
p+q>0
ψpq |pq〉, (B19)
where we take into account the constraint 〈ψx|00〉 = 0. Then, with Eq. (B18) we obtain
P˜
(A)
d =
∑
p+q>0,p′+q′>0
ψpqψ
∗
p′q′Tr[|pq0〉 〈p′q′0| (|0〉 〈0| ⊗H(b)(1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)H(b))]
=
∑
q>0,q′>0
ψ0qψ
∗
0q′Tr[|q0〉 〈q′0|H(b)(1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)H(b)]
=
∑
n≥0,q>0,q′>0
ψ0qψ
∗
0q′Tr[|q0〉 〈q′0|H(b) |n0〉 〈n0|H(b)]
=
∑
n>0
|ψ0n|2| 〈n0|H(b)|n0〉 |2
=
∑
n>0
|ψ0n|2bn,
(B20)
where we used in the fourth line the fact that H(b) doesn’t change the number of photons. Since b ∈ [0, 1], this shows
that
P˜
(A)
d 6 b
∑
n>0
|ψ0n|2
= b,
(B21)
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since |ψa〉 is normalized, and this bound is reached for |ψ01|2 = 1, i.e.|ψa〉 = |01〉. With Eq. (B17), this implies that
an optimal strategy for Alice is to prepare the state
|ψ〉 = (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |01〉
=
√
1− a |10〉+√a |01〉
=
√
z
1− (1− y)(1− z) |10〉+
√
y(1− z)
1− (1− y)(1− z) |01〉
= |φ〉 ,
(B22)
where |φ〉 is the state that dishonest Alice needs to send to maximize her winning probability when Bob uses
number-resolving detectors (Eq. (B8)). Her winning probability is then
P
(A)
d = 1− (1− y)(1− z). (B23)
We therefore recover the same result as for number-resolving detectors. Once again, if the protocol is fair then
y = 1− 12(1−x) and z = 2x, so
P
(A)
d =
1
2(1− x) , (B24)
and an optimal strategy for Alice is to prepare the state
|φx〉 := 2
√
x(1− x) |10〉+ (1− 2x) |01〉 . (B25)
Appendix C: Quantum SCF protocol
An unbalanced quantum WCF protocol can be turned into a quantum SCF protocol using an additional classical
protocol, as described in [7]. In particular, let us consider a WCF protocol such that:
P
(A)
h = p
P
(B)
h = 1− p
P
(A)
d = p+ 
P
(B)
d = 1− p+ ,
(C1)
for p ∈ [0, 1] and  > 0. Then, the corresponding SCF protocol has bias [7]
max
(
1
2 −
1
2(p− ),
1
2− (p+ ) −
1
2
)
. (C2)
For our WCF protocol, we have Eqs. (A16),(A17) and (B23):
P
(A)
h = 1− (1− x)(1− y)
P
(B)
h = (1− x)(1− y)
P
(A)
d = 1− (1− y)(1− z)
P
(B)
d = 1− x,
(C3)
with the constraint z = x1−(1−x)(1−y) (so that the protocol does not abort in the honest case, Eq. (A15)). Enforcing
the conditions in Eq. (C1), and optimizing over the corresponding SCF bias implies
x = y
2
(1− y)(1− 2y)
z = y(1− y)2
1− x2 =
1
2− y − z + yz ,
(C4)
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which in turn give the values
x ≈ 0.38
y ≈ 0.31
z ≈ 0.66,
(C5)
by enforcing x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], and a bias of ≈ 0.31, which is a lower bias than the best implemented SCF protocol so far
[20].
Appendix D: Correctness, with losses
We give a representation of the honest protocol with losses, in Fig. 5. The efficiency of Alice’s and Bob’s detectors
are denoted η(A)d and η
(B)
d , respectively. The efficiency of the quantum channel from Alice to Bob is denoted ηt, and
η
(A)
f and η
(B)
f are the efficiencies of Alice’s and Bob’s fiber delay lines, respectively.
The honest winning probability for Bob is directly given by his chance of detecting the photon (the photon gets to
his detector and doesn’t get lost):
P
(B)
h = ηtη
(B)
d (1− x)(1− y). (D1)
On the other hand, Alice wins if the photon, starting from her first input mode, is detected by Bob in the last step.
FIG. 5: Representation of the honest protocol with losses. The dashed boxes indicate Alice and Bob’s
laboratories, respectively. The reflectivity of the beamsplitters is indicated in red. The efficiencies of the detectors,
are indicated in white. Curly lines represent fiber used for quantum communication from Alice to Bob, or delay
lines within Alice’s or Bob’s laboratory. |0〉 and |1〉 are the vacuum and single photon Fock states, respectively. Bob
broadcasts the classical outcome c, which controls an optical switch on Alice’s side. The protocol when Bob declares
c = 0/1 is represented in orange/green. The final outcomes are the expected outcomes when both parties are honest.
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The evolution of the creation operator of the first mode during the lossy honest protocol is given by:
aˆ†1 →
√
xaˆ†1 +
√
1− xaˆ†2
→
√
xη
(A)
f aˆ
†
1 +
√
(1− x)ηtaˆ†2
→
√
xη
(A)
f aˆ
†
1 +
√
(1− x)ηtyaˆ†2 +
√
(1− x)(1− y)ηtaˆ†3
→
√
xη
(A)
f aˆ
†
1 +
√
(1− x)ηtyaˆ†2 +
√
(1− x)(1− y)ηtη(B)d aˆ†3
→
√
xη
(A)
f ηtaˆ
†
1 +
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f aˆ†2 +
√
(1− x)(1− y)ηtη(B)d aˆ†3
→
(√
xη
(A)
f ηtz +
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f (1− z)
)
aˆ†1 +
(√
xη
(A)
f ηt(1− z)−
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f z
)
aˆ†2
+
√
(1− x)(1− y)ηtη(B)d aˆ†3
→
(√
xη
(A)
f ηtzη
(B)
d +
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f (1− z)η(B)d
)
aˆ†1 +
(√
xη
(A)
f ηt(1− z)η(B)d −
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f zη(B)d
)
aˆ†2
+
√
(1− x)(1− y)ηtη(B)d aˆ†3.
(D2)
In particular, the photon reaches Bob’s uppermost detector with probability
P
(A)
h =
(√
xη
(A)
f ηtzη
(B)
d +
√
(1− x)ηtyη(B)f (1− z)η(B)d
)2
= ηtη(B)d
(√
xzη
(A)
f +
√
(1− x)y(1− z)η(B)f
)2
.
(D3)
Finally, the protocol aborts for all other detection events:
Pab = 1− P (A)h − P (B)h . (D4)
Appendix E: Security analysis for Dishonest Alice, with losses
The losses η correspond to a probability 1− η of losing a photon. These can be modelled as a mixing with the
vacuum on a beam splitter of reflectivity η. Dishonest Bob wins with probability
P
(B)
d = 1− xη(A)f η(A)d , (E1)
by performing the same attack as in the lossless case, since he has no control over Alice’s laboratory. In what follows,
we provide the security analysis for Dishonest Alice.
1. Lossy delay line
We show in this section that Alice’s maximum winning probability when Bob is using a delay line of efficiency ηf is
always lower than when Bob’s delay line is perfect, i.e.ηf = 1, independently of the efficiency ηd of his detectors. The
lossy delay line of efficiency ηf may be modelled as a mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission ηf .
Alice prepares a state σ, which goes through the interferometer depicted in Fig. 6, and wins if the measurement
outcome obtained by Bob is (1, 0, 0). In particular, note that the outcome 0 must be obtained for the third mode.
Hence Alice’s winning probability is always lower than if the third mode was mixed with the vacuum on a beam
splitter of transmission amplitude ηf just before the detection (Fig. 7), since this increases the probability of the
outcome 0 for this mode. Let us assume that this is the case. Then, by Lemma 2, the losses ηf on output modes 2
and 3 may be commuted back through the beam splitter of reflectivity y, acting on modes 2 and 3.
Since the input state on mode 3 is the vacuum, the losses on this mode may then be removed (Fig. 8). In that case,
the probability of winning is clearly lower than when the delay line is perfect (Fig. 9), because Alice is now restricted
to lossy state preparation instead of ideal state preparation.
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FIG. 6: Alice aims to maximize the outcome (1, 0, 0) by sending the state σ. The lossy delay line is represented by a
mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission amplitude ηf . The quantum efficiency of the detectors is
indicated in white.
FIG. 7: Adding losses on the third mode increases Alice’s winning probability.
FIG. 8: The losses ηf are commuted back to Alice’s state preparation. The losses on input mode 3 can be omitted
since the input state is the vacuum.
This reduction shows that Alice’s maximum winning probability when Bob is using a lossy delay line is always
lower than when Bob’s delay line is perfect, independently of the efficiency ηd of his detectors.
Moreover, Alice’s maximum cheating probability and optimal cheating strategy may be inferred from the case
where Bob has a perfect delay line, as we show in what follows. By convexity of the probabilities, Alice’s best strategy
is to send a pure state |ψ〉 = ∑k,l>0 ψkl |kl〉. Let us denote by W the interferometer depicted in Fig. 6, including the
detection losses. Let us consider the evolution of Alice’s state and the vacuum on the third input mode through the
16
FIG. 9: Alice aims to maximize the outcome (1, 0, 0) by sending the state σ. The delay line efficiency ηf is equal to
1.
interferometer W . The creation operator for the first mode evolves as
aˆ†1 →
√
zaˆ†1 +
√
1− zaˆ†2
→ √zηdaˆ†1 +
√
(1− z)ηdaˆ†2
= Waˆ†1W †,
(E2)
while the creation operator for the second mode evolves as
aˆ†2 →
√
yaˆ†2 +
√
1− yaˆ†3
→ √yηf aˆ†2 +
√
1− yaˆ†3
→
√
y(1− z)ηf aˆ†1 −
√
yzηf aˆ
†
2 +
√
1− yaˆ†3
→
√
y(1− z)ηfηdaˆ†1 −
√
yzηfηdaˆ
†
2 +
√
(1− y)ηdaˆ†3
= Waˆ†2W †.
(E3)
Hence, the output state (before the ideal threshold detection) is given by
W |ψ0〉 = W
∑
k,l>0
ψkl |kl0〉
= W
∑
k,l>0
ψkl√
k!l!
(aˆ†1)k(aˆ
†
2)l
 |000〉
=
∑
k,l>0
ψkl√
k!l!
(Waˆ†1W †)k(Waˆ
†
2W
†)l
 |000〉
=
∑
k,l>0
ψkl√
k!l!
(√zηdaˆ†1 +
√
(1− z)ηdaˆ†2)k(
√
y(1− z)ηfηdaˆ†1 −
√
yzηfηdaˆ
†
2 +
√
(1− y)ηdaˆ†3)l
 |000〉 .
(E4)
Now Alice’s maximum cheating probability is given by
P
(A)
d = Tr[W |ψ0〉 〈ψ0|W †(1− |0〉 〈0|) |00〉 〈00|]. (E5)
Hence, the state after a successful projection (1− |0〉 〈0|) |00〉 〈00|, which has norm P (A)d , reads[ ∑
k+l>0
ψkl√
k!l!
(zηd)k/2[y(1− z)ηfηd]l/2(aˆ†1)k+l
]
|000〉 . (E6)
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When Bob has a perfect delay line (ηf = 1) this state reads[ ∑
k+l>0
ψkl√
k!l!
(zηd)k/2[y(1− z)ηd]l/2(aˆ†1)k+l
]
|000〉 , (E7)
and its norm is the winning probability of Alice in that case. Hence,
P
(A)
d [ηf , ηd, y, z] = P
(A)
d [1, ηd, yηf , z], (E8)
i.e.we can obtain Alice’s cheating probability by solving the case with perfect delay line, and replacing the parameter
y by yηf . In the following, we thus derive Alice’s optimal strategy in that case.
2. Perfect delay line
Let σ be the state sent by Alice, and ηd the detector efficiency. She needs to maximize the probability of the overall
outcome (1, 0, 0) at the output of the interferometer depicted in Fig. 10, hence the overlap with the projector:
Πηd(1,0,0) =
[
1−
∑
m
(1− ηd)m |m〉 〈m|
]
⊗
[∑
n,p
(1− ηd)n+p |n〉 〈n| ⊗ |p〉 〈p|
]
. (E9)
By convexity of the probabilities, we may assume without loss of generality that Alice sends a pure state σ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|.
Moreover, the imperfect threshold detectors of quantum efficiency ηd can be modelled by mixing the state to be
measured with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission amplitude ηd followed by an ideal threshold detection [27].
In that case, this corresponds to losses ηd on modes 1, 2, and 3, followed by ideal threshold detections. By Lemma 2,
commuting the losses back through the interferometer leads to the equivalent picture depicted in Fig. 11, where the
losses on input mode 3 have been omitted, since the input state is the vacuum.
In that case, Alice’s probability of winning is clearly lower than when the threshold detectors are perfect (Fig. 3),
because she is restricted to lossy state preparation instead of ideal state preparation. Let |ψ˜〉 be the lossy state
obtained by applying losses ηd on both modes of Alice’s prepared state |ψ〉. Alice’s winning probability may then be
written:
P
(A)
d = Tr[U(|ψ˜〉 〈ψ˜| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1− |0〉 〈0|)⊗ |00〉 〈00|]
= Tr[U(|ψ˜〉 〈ψ˜| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)]− Tr[U(|ψ˜〉 〈ψ˜| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U† |000〉 〈000|],
(E10)
where U = (H(z) ⊗ 1)(1⊗H(y)) is the unitary corresponding to the general interferometer of the lossless protocol.
By Lemma 1, we have
Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)U†(1⊗ |00〉 〈00|)U ] = Tr[(τ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V †(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V ], (E11)
for any density matrix τ , where V = (1⊗H(b))(H(a) ⊗ 1)(1⊗R(pi)⊗ 1), with a = y(1−z)y+z−yz and b = y + z − yz, and
R(pi) a phase shift of pi acting on mode 2. Hence,
P
(A)
d = Tr[V (|ψ˜〉 〈ψ˜| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V †(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)]− Tr[|ψ˜〉 〈ψ˜| |00〉 〈00|], (E12)
where we used U† |000〉 = |000〉 for the second term. Setting |ψ˜x〉 = (H(a) ⊗ 1)(1⊗R(pi)) |ψ˜〉 yields
P
(A)
d = Tr[(|ψ˜x〉 〈ψ˜x| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(1⊗H(b))(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(1⊗H(b))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡P1
−Tr[|ψ˜x〉 〈ψ˜x| |00〉 〈00|]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡P2
, (E13)
where we used |00〉 = (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |00〉 for the second term P2.
Let us consider the first term P1. Since |ψ˜〉 is the state obtained by applying losses ηd on both modes of the state
|ψ〉, we obtain the equivalent picture in Fig. 12, where we have added losses ηd also on mode 3, since the input state
is the vacuum.
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Let |ψx〉 = H(a)(1 ⊗ R(pi)) |ψ〉. With Lemma 2, commuting the losses ηd to the output of the interferometer in
Fig. 12, and combining the losses on mode 2 and 3 yields
P1 = Tr[|ψx〉 〈ψx|Πηd(0) ⊗Πηd(1−b)(0) ], (E14)
where Πη(0) is the POVM element corresponding to no click for a threshold detector of quantum efficiency η (recall
that this is the same as an ideal detector preceded by a mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission
amplitude η). The same reasoning for the second term P2 gives
P2 = Tr[|ψx〉 〈ψx|Πηd(0) ⊗Πηd(0)], (E15)
and we finally obtain with Eq. (E13),
P
(A)
d = Tr[|ψx〉 〈ψx|Πηd(0) ⊗ (Πηd(1−b)(0) −Πηd(0))]. (E16)
FIG. 10: Alice aims to maximize the outcome (1, 0, 0) by sending the state σ. The quantum efficiency of the
detectors is indicated in white.
FIG. 11: The quantum efficiency are modelled as losses ηd on modes 1, 2, and 3, which are then commuted through
the interferometer, back to Alice’s state preparation. The losses on input mode 3 can be omitted since the input state
is the vacuum.
Let us write |ψx〉 =
∑+∞
k,l≥0 ψkl |kl〉. With the expression of the POVM in Eq. (E9) the last equation reads
P
(A)
d =
∑
k,l≥0
|ψkl|2(1− ηd)k[(1− ηd(1− b))l − (1− ηd)l]
6 max
k,l>0
(1− ηd)k[(1− ηd(1− b))l − (1− ηd)l]
∑
k,l>0
|ψkl|2
= max
k,l>0
(1− ηd)k[(1− ηd(1− b))l − (1− ηd)l]
= max
l>1
[(1− ηd(1− b))l − (1− ηd)l]
= max
l>1
[(1− ηd(1− y)(1− z))l − (1− ηd)l],
(E17)
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FIG. 12: An equivalent picture for the first term P1 of Eq. (E13). The term P1 is the probability of the simultaneous
outcomes 0 for modes 1 and 3.
where we used b = y+z−yz. Let l0 ∈ N∗ such that maxl>1 [(1− ηd(1− b))l − (1− ηd)l] = (1−ηd(1−b))l0−(1−ηd)l0 .
This last expression is an upperbound for P (A)d , which is attained for ψkl = δk,0δl,l0 , i.e.|ψx〉 = |0l0〉. Thus, the best
strategy for Alice is to send the state
|ψ〉 = (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |ψx〉
= (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |0l0〉 ,
(E18)
where a = y(1−z)y+z−yz , and her winning probability is then
P
(A)
d = (1− ηd(1− y)(1− z))l0 − (1− ηd)l0 , (E19)
when Bob has a perfect delay line. Recalling Eq. (E8), the best strategy for Alice when Bob has a lossy delay line of
efficiency ηf is to send the state
|ψ〉 = (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |ψx〉
= (1⊗R(pi))H(a) |0l1〉 ,
(E20)
where a = y(1−z)ηfyηf+z−yzηf , and l1 ∈ N∗ maximizes (1− ηd(1− yηf )(1− z))l − (1− ηd)l. Her winning probability is then
P
(A)
d = max
l>0
[
(1− (1− yηf )(1− z)ηd)l − (1− ηd)l
]
= (1− ηd(1− yηf )(1− z))l1 − (1− ηd)l1
= ηd[1− (1− yηf )(1− z)]
l1−1∑
j=0
(1− ηd)j(1− ηd(1− yηf )(1− z))l1−j−1
6 ηd[1− (1− yηf )(1− z)]
l1−1∑
j=0
(1− ηd)j
= ηd[1− (1− yηf )(1− z)]1− (1− ηd)
l1
1− (1− ηd)
= [1− (1− yηf )(1− z)][1− (1− ηd)l1 ]
6 1− (1− yηf )(1− z)
6 1− (1− y)(1− z),
(E21)
and this last expression is the winning probability when there are no losses.
Let us derive the value of l1. For this, we define:
r = 1− ηd(1− yηf )(1− z)
s = 1− ηd. (E22)
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We then consider a λ1 ∈ R∗+ which maximizes (rλ − sλ) for λ ∈ R∗+. We have that:
d
dλ1
(rλ1 − sλ1) = 0⇔ λ1 = ln ln s− ln ln rln r − ln s , (E23)
for strictly non-zero r and s and where ln denotes the complex logarithm function. This allows to deduce:
l1 =
 floor(λ1) if r
floor(λ1) − sfloor(λ1) > rceil(λ1) − sceil(λ1)
ceil(λ1) if rceil(λ1) − sceil(λ1) > rfloor(λ1) − sfloor(λ1).
(E24)
Appendix F: Solving the system from Eq. (4)
1. Condition (i)
The first condition enforces a fair protocol, i.e.P (A)h = P
(B)
h . With Eqs. (D1) and (D3), we aim to solve for y as a
function of x and z:
(i)⇔ ηtη(B)d
(√
xzη
(A)
f +
√
(1− x)y(1− z)η(B)f
)2
= ηtη(B)d (1− x)(1− y)
(i)⇔ (1− x)
[
(1− z)η(B)f + 1
]
y + 2
√
x(1− x)z(1− z)η(A)f η(B)f
√
y + xzη(A)f − (1− x) = 0.
(F1)
We make the substitution Y = √y in order to transform Eq. (F1) into a second-order polynomial equation. We then
take only the positive solution (since y must be positive) which reads:
Y =
√
xz(1− z)η(A)f η(B)f −
[
(1− z)η(B)f + 1
] [
xzη
(A)
f − (1− x)
]
−
√
xz(1− z)η(A)f η(B)f
√
1− x
[
(1− z)η(B)f + 1
] . (F2)
We may finally write:
(i)⇔ y = f
(
x, z, η
(i)
f , ηd, ηt
)
, (F3)
where f
(
x, z, η
(i)
f , ηd, ηt
)
=
(√
(1−x)
[
(1−z)η(B)
f
+1
]
−xzη(A)
f
−
√
xz(1−z)η(A)
f
η
(B)
f
)2
(1−x)
[
(1−z)η(B)
f
+1
]2 .
Note that y should be a real number, and hence we require that the expression under the first square root of
f
(
x, z, η
(i)
f , ηd, ηt
)
is positive, i.e.:
z 6
(1− x)(1 + η(B)f )
xη
(A)
f + (1− x)η(B)f
. (F4)
Furthermore, note that, for η(A)f = η
(B)
f = ηf , y should be an increasing function of ηf , and therefore a decreasing
function of d when ηf = 10−
0.2
10 2d. Mathematically speaking, this is to prevent y′(d)→∞ and y(d) > 1. Physically
speaking, this condition ensures that, as the probability of transmitting the photon (and of preserving it for verification)
gets smaller, Bob should encourage a detection on the third mode, which evens out the honest probabilities of winning.
2. Condition (ii)
The second condition enforces a balanced protocol, i.e.P (A)d = P
(B)
d . With Eqs. (E1) and (E21), this translates into
the following expression for x:
(ii)⇔ x = g
(
y, z, η
(i)
f , η
(i)
d
)
, (F5)
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where
g
(
y, z, η
(i)
f , η
(i)
d
)
= 1
η
(A)
f η
(A)
d
[
1−max
l>1
[(1− η(B)d (1− yη(B)f )(1− z))l − (1− η(B)d )l]
]
. (F6)
3. Condition (iii)
We recall the general coin flipping formalism from [24], in which any classical or quantum coin flipping protocol
may be expressed as:
CF (p00, p11, p∗0, p∗1, p0∗, p1∗) , (F7)
where pii is the probability that two honest players output value i ∈ {0, 1}, p∗i is the probability that Dishonest
Alice forces Honest Bob to declare outcome i, and pi∗ is the probability that Dishonest Bob forces Honest Alice to
declare outcome i. In this formalism, a perfect SCF protocol can then be expressed as CF
( 1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, while
a perfect WCF may be expressed as CF
( 1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 1, 1,
1
2
)
. We may now express our quantum WCF protocol in the
lossless setting as:
CF
(
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
[
1
2(1− x)
]
, 1, 1, [1− x]
)
. (F8)
In the lossy setting, note that the probabilities that Alice and Bob each choose to lose (i.e. p∗1 and p0∗, respectively),
both remain 1. When Dishonest Bob chooses to lose, he may always declare outcome 0 regardless of what he detects,
which yields p0∗ = 1. When Dishonest Alice chooses to lose, she may send a state |n〉 to Bob, and so:
p∗1 = Tr
[
H(y) |n0〉 〈n0|H(y)I ⊗ (I −Π0)
]
= 1− Tr
[
H(y) |n0〉 〈n0|H(y)(I ⊗Π0)
]
,
(F9)
where Π0 =
∑
l≥0(1− η)l |l〉 〈l| and H(y) =
 √y √1− y√
1− y −√y
.
Now,
H(y) |n0〉 = H(y) (aˆ
†
1)n√
n!
|00〉
= 1√
n!
(√yaˆ†1 +
√
1− yaˆ†2)n |00〉
= 1√
n!
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
y
k
2 (1− y)n−k2 aˆ†k1 aˆ†(n−k)2 |00〉
=
n∑
k=0
√(
n
k
)
yk(1− y)n−k |k (n− k)〉 .
(F10)
We thus obtain, by linearity of the trace:
p∗1 = 1−
∑
l,l′≥0
(1− η)l
n∑
k,k′=0
√(
n
k
)
yk(1− y)n−k
√(
n
k′
)
yk′(1− y)n−k′Tr [|k (n− k)〉 〈k′ (n− k′)| |l′l〉 〈l′l|]
= 1−
n∑
k=0
(1− η)n−k
(
n
k
)
yk(1− y)n−k
= 1− [y + (1− η)(1− y)]n ,
(F11)
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which goes to 1 when n goes to infinity, for y < 1. Hence, in the lossy setting, the protocol becomes a:
CF
(
P
(A)
h , P
(B)
h , P
(A)
d , 1, 1, P
(B)
d
)
, (F12)
where P (A)d = maxl>0
(
1− (1− yη(A)f )(1− z)η(B)d
)l
−
(
1− η(B)d
)l
and P (B)d = 1− xη(A)f η(A)d .
Using Theorem 1 from [24], there exists a classical protocol that implements an information-theoretically secure
coin flip with our parameters if and only if the following conditions hold:

P
(A)
h ≤ P (A)d
P
(B)
h ≤ P (B)d
Pab = 1− P (A)h − P (B)h ≥ (1− P (A)d )(1− P (B)d ).
(F13)
Our quantum protocol therefore presents an advantage over classical protocols if at least one of these conditions cannot
be satisfied. Since we are interested in fair and balanced protocols, setting Ph = P (A)h = P
(B)
h and Pd = P
(A)
d = P
(B)
d
allows to rewrite (F13) as: {
Ph ≤ Pd
Pab = 1− 2Ph ≥ (1− Pd)2 ⇔ Ph ≤ 12 [1− (1− Pd)2].
(F14)
Let us finally remark that for all x we have 12 [1− (1− x)2] = x− x
2
2 ≤ x, so the first inequality above is implied by
the second. The system is thus equivalent to the second inequality:
Pab = 1− 2Ph ≥ (1− Pd)2, (F15)
provided that P (A)h = P
(B)
h = Ph and P
(A)
d = P
(B)
d = Pd.
In order to get a clearer insight into the meaning of quantum advantage, we express this condition in terms of
cheating probability: our protocol displays quantum advantage if and only if the lowest classical cheating probability
PCd = 1−
√
1− 2Ph = 1−
√
Pab (F16)
exceeds our quantum cheating probability PQd .
Appendix G: Practical quantum advantage for various detection efficiencies
In this section, we plot the numerical solutions to the system from Eq. (4) in order to display quantum advantage
as a function of distance for various detection efficiencies. Numerical values for the lowest classical and quantum
cheating probabilities, PCd and P
Q
d , are plotted as a function of distance d in blue and red, respectively. Our quantum
protocol performs strictly better than any classical protocol when PQd < PCd . We set ηf = ηsη2t , where ηs is the
fiber delay transmission corresponding to 500ns of optical switching time, and η2t =
(
10− 0.210 d
)2
is the fiber delay
transmission associated with travelling distance d twice (once for quantum, once for classical) in single-mode fibers
with attenuation 0.2 dB/km.
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FIG. 13: Parameters ηd = 0.95 and z = 0.57. Note that honest abort probability Pab is plotted in magenta.
FIG. 14: Parameters ηd = 0.90 and z = 0.63. Note that honest abort probability has been omitted in order to zoom
in, but it lies around 0.15 for these distances.
